



EQUILIBRIUM REAL EXCHANGE RATE IN BRAZIL 













Revised: November 2004 
 
Paper presented at the 9
th meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic 








This paper examines the determinants of the real effective exchange rate (REER) in 
Brazil, from 1994 to 2003. Building on a standard theoretical model and based on the 
Johansen cointegration estimation, the main finding is that much of the long-run 
behavior of the REER can be explained by relative productivity differentials, real 
commodity prices, government expenditures on tradables and non-tradables, trade 
openness and real interest differentials. On the basis of these fundamentals, the level of 
misalignment of the Real was found to be surprisingly modest during the Real Plan 
(1994-1998). As of end 2003, the Real was found to be slightly appreciated with respect 
to the estimated equilibrium level, although the extent of the misalignment appears to be 
small as well. The paper also discusses the implications of these findings with regard to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ten years after the beginning of the Real plan in Brazil, the controversy surrounding the 
role of the exchange rate between 1994 and 1998 seems to have somewhat vanished, as 
many see the demise of the plan as a story whose plot was basically foretold long before 
the Real collapsed in January 1999
2. To be sure, the 1999 Brazilian crisis seems to fit a 
familiar pattern in countries that use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor to stabilize 
inflation: the usual real exchange rate appreciation which follows exchange rate 
stabilization programs leads to unsustainable current account deficits and eventually 
currency collapse
3. After the East-Asian crisis, the Russian crisis in 1998 and more 
recently, the spectacular failure of Argentina’s currency board system in 2001, have 
reinforced this perception. It is important to note that the later two cases –as in Brazil- 
one of the crucial elements was the unsustainability of the fiscal accounts. The 
conventional wisdom of the early 1990s regarding the superiority of nominal anchors in 
fighting inflation has given rise to a new enthusiasm about flexible exchange rates in 
order to avoid growing currency misalignments and costly exit strategies. 
 
However, it is interesting to recall that the issue of real exchange rate misalignment was 
heavily debated during the Real plan. Few economists disagreed over the fact that the 
Brazilian currency was overvalued during the Real plan, but there was no consensus over 
the size of the overvaluation. This had a lot to do, at the time, with the complexity of 
measuring prices indices properly in the midst of a major price stabilization effort and 
with the currency reform introduced in the course of 1994
4. In addition, interest in the 
overvaluation issue seemed to vary according to the international atmosphere: “when 
markets were buoyant, the issue was left aside; when they were, instead, sluggish, the 
currency was overvalued by 25% or more, or at least, market participants seemed to 
consume more intensively the 25% overvaluation.”
5 As an illustration, BACHA [1997] 
estimated that the real overvaluation was a modest 6% in 1996, while other Brazilian 
authors’ estimations pointed to misalignment levels close to 40% during the same 
period
6. The position of the IMF on the issue is also reported to have moved from an 
initial perception of 33% overvaluation in early 1995 to a more hesitant view about the 
level of misalignment
7; in late 1998, the IMF staff apparently believed that that the Real 
was overvalued by 15-20%, i.e. a somewhat smaller level of overvaluation than that 
reported by other outside assessments
8. Against this background, this paper attempts to 
examine the determinants of the real exchange rate in Brazil both during and after the 
                                                 
2 CARDOSO [2000], p.70. 
3 From 1994 to early January 1999, Brazil’s exchange rate policy was technically that of a European-style 
managed currency band regime (crawling peg). 
4 See FRANCO [2000], pp.7-8. In particular, one should recall that one of the central elements of the Real 
plan was the introduction of the Real, on July 1
st, 1994. But the actual introduction of the new currency was 
preceded by a period of four months, during which contracts, prices, wages and the exchange rate (then still 
for the cruzeiro real) were linked to a single unit of account adjusted on a daily basis, the unidade real de 
valor (URV). 
5 FRANCO [2000], p.78. 
6 See DORNBUSCH [1997] pp.379-380. 
7 It is reported (IMF [2003]) that in 1997,  the staff began to recalculate the real effective exchange rate 
relative to the 1994 average. 
8 See IMF [2003], pp.124-125.   3
Real plan, with the view of investigating the evolution of the misalignment issue in 
calculating the deviation from the “equilibrium” real exchange rate implied by the model. 
The objective of this investigation is not only to shed some light on real exchange rate 
fundamentals, but also to derive some policy implications regarding the competitiveness 
of the Brazilian economy in general, ten years after the launching of the Real plan. The 
paper is organized as follows: section II presents some background information on real 
exchange rate developments in Brazil in the 1990s; section III introduces the theoretical 
model underlying the analysis, which happens to be a standard internal-external 
equilibrium model borrowed from the works of HINKLE & MONTIEL [1999]; section IV 
presents the estimation technique and the results; section V discusses some general policy 
implications with respect to competitiveness since the 1999 devaluation and section V 
offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
II. REAL EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS IN BRAZIL DURING THE LAST DECADE 
 
As shown by Chart 1, the (multilateral) real trade-weighted exchange rate (REER) 
appreciated by a sizable amount between 1994 and 1998, but the choice of the base 
period is of course crucial to determine the extend of the misalignment. Compared to the 
preceeding fourteen years, the REER appreciated around 25%, but the misalignment was 
only about 14% compared to early 1994 levels (Table 1). Note also that the misalignment 
of the 1989-91 period, associated with the failure of the Verão plan and the beginning of 
the Collor stabilization plan, was much larger
9. Interestingly, the REER has exhibited a 
fair amount of volatility since the January 1999 devaluation, although following a 
depreciating trend. As of end 2003, the REER was at levels, close to those of the mid-
1980s, that is, to its lowest levels. 
 
Alternatives measures of the real exchange rate (either using producer prices instead of 
“traditional” consumer prices, or real wages) indicate a similar appreciating trend during 
the crawling peg period, as shown in Chart 3. Another popular measure is the famous 
“Big Mac Index” published by The Economist since the early 1990s, and relying on an 
extreme version of the purchasing power parity, i.e. the law of one price. Even if strong 
reservations can (and should) be made regarding the Big Mac Index
10, the implied   
overvaluation during the Real Plan period was similar to that implied by other methods. 
Interestingly, the Real appears to be significantly undervalued as of April 2004 according 
to the Big Mac Index (Chart 4), a claim that will be examined later in the paper on the 
basis of our results. In any case, irrespective of the measure chosen, the bulk of the 
appreciation intervened in 1994 and 1995, as shown in Chart 5. 
                                                 
9 CARDOSO [2000], p.80 notes that the only real exchange rate misalignment comparable to that of the Real 
plan was the 1980-82 period, but Chart 1 seems to indicate that the 1989-91 period offers a more striking 
case. 
10 As it is well known, absolute PPP is supposed to hold in the long run only, and rests on restrictive  
assumptions. Furthermore, departures from PPP in the short run are common, owing to various factors 
including the existence of barriers to trade (tariffs, taxes and transportation costs), the inclusion of non-
traded elements in the price index used, and pricing to market. As shown by PAKKO & POLLARD [2003], 
differences in “Big Mac” prices across countries ultimately reflect differences in net hourly wages, thereby 
suggesting that deviations from PPP are driven by the Balassa-Samuelson effect.   4























































































































Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) 









Therefore, a rise in the index represents an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, i.e. a rise in the 
price of non-tradables relative to the price of tradables. 
 
Table 1. Real Exchange Rate Misalignments in Brazil 
 
Average 1994-98 overvaluation relative to average 1980-93  24% 
Median 1994-98 overvaluation relative to median 1980-93  27% 
Average 1994-98 overvaluation relative to early 1994 levels  14% 
Average 1989-91 overvaluation relative to 1980-88  31% 
 






































































































































Note: Volatility is measure as the 4-month moving average of the standard deviation  
of the real effective exchange rate series 
Source: author’s calculations on the basis of IMF data 
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REER based on CPI
REER based on PPI
Dollar Wage
 
Source: IMF, Banco Central do Brasil 
 























































Source: The Economist 
 




































































REER change (IMF) REER change (IIF)
 
Source: IMF, Institute of International Finance (IIF)   6
It is important, however, to distinguish the share of the real appreciation that is justified 
by changes in fundamentals from the share signaling a competitiveness problem, and 
hence, a real overvaluation problem. This is easier said than done in practice, as a fair 
amount of controversy surrounds the measurement of some key variables, such as 
productivity gains. The productivity issue was actually at the heart of the debate between 
the Brazilian authorities and the IMF at the beginning of the Real plan, as the former 
insisted on the fact that some portion of the appreciation reflected higher productivity 
gains, associated with the structural reforms taking place in Brazil (i.e. privatization).  
 
As shown in Chart 6a, productivity appears indeed to have increased sharply in 1993-
1994, with productivity changes more or less matching changes in the real effective 
exchange rate, but the story is different for 1995, when productivity plummeted while 
real appreciation continued. Productivity increased back during 1996-1997 as part of the 
investment cycle
11. Yet, a substantial portion of the productivity gains was passed on 
wages in the early years of stabilization
12, producing a significant increase in real wages 
(Chart 7), which negatively affected competitiveness. Even more revealing is the fact that 
dollar wages increased substantially in the beginning of the stabilization program, 
whereas the combination of trade opening and stabilization should have induced the 
opposite effect in the short run. In addition, as noted by DORNBUSCH [1997], the 
productivity argument deserves close scrutiny, because all too often, “large productivity 
gains may simply mean high unemployment”(p.386). In the Brazilian case, it is widely 
recognized that the increase in productivity during 1991-1994 was achieved mainly 
through employment reduction, and (official) unemployment figures show indeed a 
deterioration between 1991 and 1993 and between 1993 and 1998, which indeed suggests 
that firms found it very hard to compete
13, especially at the time when the economy was 
liberalizing its trade regime. Following the January 1999 devaluation, productivity 
changes have been much more modest, however, and even negative in 2001, although it 
is to be noted that real wages have only adjusted back to their pre-Real Plan levels.  
 
                                                 
11 OECD [2001], pp.43-44. 
12 DORNSBUSCH [1997], p.375, reports that the real income of the bottom 50% of the income distribution 
rose by 35% between 1993 and 1995.  
13 CAMARGO, NERI & CORTEZ REIS [1999] note that although employment increased in the service and 
commerce sectors, these increases were not enough to compensate for the global  decline in employment 
levels.   7






















































































































Productivity change (Manufacturing, YoY)
















































































































































Productivity change (Manufacturing, YoY)
Productivity change (Industry, YoY)
REER change (YoY) RHS
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of IBGE and IMF data 
Note: The manufacturing productivity index comes from IBGE. Industrial productivity was calculated as 
the ratio of production index to the number of paid hours (Horas pagas - na produção)   8
































































































































































































































































The productivity puzzle remains heavily debated, essentially because the structural 
reforms launched in the mid-1990s as part of the stabilization plan made it difficult at the 
time to properly gauge the precise magnitude of the disequilibrium. But the one 
dimension which is rarely debated is that competitiveness issues are likely to arise when 
real appreciation is associated with a serious loss of growth and high external imbalances, 
leading to rapidly unsustainable debt financing situations. From this perspective, the 
impact of the Real plan on the trade balance suffers little discussion: Brazil moved from a 
situation of current account equilibrium in 1992-1993 to a rapidly growing external 
deficit, as evidenced by Chart 8, while real GDP growth declined drastically from 1994 to 
1998. The impact of the combination of real exchange rate appreciation and far reaching 
trade liberalization is also quite visible on trade flows: the trade surplus, which had been 
generally positive before the Real plan, turned negative (Chart 9), as import growth 
outgrew export growth until the devaluation (Chart 10). Note also that total export 
earnings growth has been fairly flat over the last decade, increasing only recently as a 
result of booming commodity prices. Chart 10 also makes clear that in 2001 and 2002, 
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Chart 9.  












































































































































































































Trade Balance (US$ mn) REER 
 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil, IMF 
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Source: IIF 




Lastly, another factor supporting the appreciating trend of the exchange rate in Brazil has 
been the prevalence of extremely high interest rates, both in nominal and real terms. As it 
is well known, the weakest link in the Real plan was fiscal adjustment, as the progress 
achieved in 1994 rapidly lost steam. The emergence of growing deficits at the state level, 
the recognition of contingent liabilities in state-owned enterprises (state banks in 
particular), the exponential costs of the pension system as well as some expenditure fever  
led to growing primary and consolidated deficits (Chart 11). Naturally, the need for 
increased deficit financing put upward pressure on already high interest rates. Additional 
pressures included the tendency to use tight monetary policy as a substitute for fiscal 
reform
14, and declining domestic savings in the face of growing current account deficits. 
This made foreign savings a key part in the equation, hence the need to maintain high 
interest rates in order to keep attracting capital inflows. To be sure, the average real 
interest rate from 1995 to 1998 was around 15%, with a peak at 34% in 1997. During the 
same period, net equity investment reached US$18-20 bn (Chart 12), on average, that is 
more than a ten-fold increase compared to the period 1983-1993. This inflow of capital  
contributed to a sizable accumulation of international reserves, and fueled (or at least  
sustained) the overvaluation of the currency, despite the sterilization policy conducted by 
the monetary authorities and the imposition of capital controls on short-term flows. 
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Source: World Bank Global Development Indicators 
 
 






























































Ex-post, it appears that all these factors contributed to increase the vulnerability of the 
Brazilian economy to foreign shocks, despite an impressive record on curbing inflation. 
Does it automatically mean that in early 1994, the exchange rate was at a point where it 
inevitably had to return, although at a “glacial rate” of 15% a year (ROGOFF [1996]) ? 
Prima facie, Brazil’s case seems to be consistent with GOLDFAJN & VALDEZ  [1999]   12
findings that the probability of smooth return appreciations is very small for currencies 
which happen to be misaligned by 35% or more.  Indeed, the combination of high 
financial needs to finance the public sector’s deficit and extremely high interest rates , 
made the sustainability of the debt increasingly questionable, especially given the 
financial turbulence associated with the East Asian crisis. Although the real appreciation 
of the currency declined in 1998 (the REER actually depreciated 3%), the Russian crisis 
worsened investors’ sentiments vis-à-vis Brazil, and devaluation expectations started to 
build up rapidly. In fact, the Real was allowed to float freely less than five months after 
the collapse of the Russian Rouble, amid fears of full-blown financial crisis
15. And even 
though the chain of events leading to the 1999 devaluation  was mainly driven by the lack 
of fiscal adjustment in Brazil and by a suddenly risk-adverse external environment, it is 
pretty clear that the perceived misalignment of the currency was part of the equation, not 
least because it was a byproduct of loose fiscal policy and very tight monetary policy. 
The Russian crisis apparently convinced both foreign investors and local residents to 




Although a detailed analysis of the Real crisis lies outside the scope of this paper, it is 
crucial for the purpose of the analysis to underscore the very rapid post-crisis recovery. 
As noted by CARDOSO [2000], “Brazil has navigated its way through the Real crisis with 
extraordinary ease and speed” (p.87), especially with respect to the inflation situation, 
which was, one of the greatest fears associated with the devaluation. Despite some initial 
instability, the behavior of the REER and the remarkable post-devaluation stabilization 
may indicate that the real exchange rate returned to some form of equilibrium. As this 
discussion suggests, there is plenty of ex-post anecdotal evidence pointing to the 
significant overvaluation of the Real during the Real Plan, and to the possible 
undervaluation of the currency at the end of 2003. This evidence needs to be tested 















                                                 
15 On this, see BLUSTEIN [2001], chapters 12 and 13, for a vivid description of the ‘bailing-in” of Brazil, 
and GRUBEN & WELCH [2001]. 
16 See for instance BAIG & GOLDFAJN [2000], who note that Brazilian resident reinforced the speculation 
once they realized that foreign investors had joined the outflow.   13
III. ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The concept of real equilibrium exchange rates has generated a large body of literature
17, 
driven by the emerging consensus that the standard purchasing power parity (PPP) is not 
an appropriate model of real equilibrium exchange rates, owing to persistent deviations 
from PPP, which may be explained by permanent real shocks. As a result, the real 
exchange rate is very often non-stationary. The usual suspects in terms of real shocks 
include productivity differentials, based on the Samuelson-Balassa hypothesis
18, as well 
as the underlying net foreign assets position, which determines whether the exchange rate 
is consistent with the current account balance. These effects have been traditionally 
integrated in simple two good/two country models, where the real equilibrium exchange 
rate clears both internal and external balances. The theoretical framework described 
below actually fits into the same category of models. Under some assumptions discussed 
in HINKLE & MONTIEL [1999], the internal balance condition is defined as follows:  
 
() 0    , 0     , 0 ) 1 ( , ,                < ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ + − = δ φ θ δ φ N N N N N y y e y g ec e y          (1) 
 
Where  yN and gN are, respectively, the level of output of non-traded goods in the 
economy and the government’s consumption of such goods, e is the “importables” real 
exchange rate
19, φ is the productivity differential of tradables , δ is the terms of trade, c is 
private absorption (measured in terms of tradables) and θ is the share of tradables in 
private absorption. Note that an improvement of the terms of trade lowers the relative 
price of non-traded goods, and therefore, reduces the supply of non-traded goods yN .  
The locus of points for which the internal balance is in equilibrium is shown as the IB 
schedule on Chart 13, indicating a negative relationship between private consumption  
and the real exchange rate: as a rise in private consumption creates an excess demand for 
non-traded goods, the real exchange rate has to decline to restore equilibrium, hence 
0 < ∂ ∂ c e . 
 
The external balance condition sets the current account deficit equal to the sustainable 
level of capital flows, as defined in equation (2): 
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17 See ROGOFF [1996] for a survey. 
18 The Balassa-Samuelson effect describes the role of differential productivity growth rates in the tradable 
and the non-tradable sectors in real appreciation of the real exchange rate. This typically happens in 
countries undergoing price stabilization and trade opening. 
19 Defined as the price of traded goods in terms of non-traded goods, i.e.  N T P EP e
* = , with E being the 
nominal exchange rate, while the price of traded goods is expressed in foreign currency.   14
Where f , b and z are, respectively, total net foreign assets, the trade balance and the 
value of international transfers received by the country; r* is the real interest rate on 
foreign assets, π* is the foreign inflation rate, e is the real exchange rate, yEX  and yIM are, 
respectively, the domestic production of exportables and importables, gIM is 
government’s consumption on importables, and τ is the transaction cost of 
consumption
20. The difference between the production of tradable goods and the 
associated domestic demand is the domestic excess supply of tradable goods 
() [] T IM EX g c y y + + − + θ τ δ , which is equal to the trade balance surplus. Adding up the 
net interest receipts from abroad and the value of international transfers yields the 
standard balance of payments. External balance can be assumed to hold when the level of 
net foreign assets has reached steady-state equilibrium. In this context, the locus of points 
for which the external balance is in equilibrium is shown as the EB schedule in Chart 13, 
indicating a positive relationship between private consumption and the real exchange 
rate: a rise in private consumption generates a trade deficit, which requires an increase in 
the real exchange rate (real depreciation) to restore equilibrium, hence  0 > ∂ ∂ c e . 
 
 















The equilibrium real exchange rate e
e , given by the intersection of the IB and EB 
schedules, is that which is simultaneously consistent with internal as well as external 
balances in the long run.  Combining equations (1) and (2) and solving for the 
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Equation (3) simply suggests that the long run equilibrium exchange rate will be affected 
by a combination of exogenous and endogenous factors (the service balance {r*+π*}f  as 
well as the transaction cost τ), which depend on the specifications of the full model. Note 
also that the effect of an improvement in the terms of trade δ is generally associated to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate through the income effect (higher export prices 
triggers higher private consumption of both tradables and non-tradables, with requires an 
appreciation of e to restore domestic balance), assuming that the latter is stronger than the 
depreciation of the real exchange rate which is required to restore external balance (an 
improvement of the terms of trade tends to worsen the trade balance). The next step is to 
recognize that transaction costs (measured by τ) depend on the ratio of money holdings in 
the Montiel model, and therefore, on the nominal interest rate, which is the opportunity 
cost of holding money. Assuming that international transfers are negligible, steady-state 
debt service becomes, under certain conditions, a function of the real foreign interest rate 
r*. For simplicity, the role of interest rates on the demand of money and on the service 
account can be captured by a real interest differential
21. Finally, it is also possible to 
include in the model a measure of trade policy stance, denoted as η, which is bound to 
affect both internal and external balances
22, thereby implying that a tightening of trade 
policy would result in an appreciation of the real exchange rate, i.e.  0 < ∂ ∂ η
e e . 








                                                 
21 This is a departure from Montiel’s original model, and to some extent, a rough approximation of the 
dynamics involved. In Montiel’s model, the nominal domestic interest rate is tied down in the long run to 
the domestic inflation rate of tradables and to a time preference rate (not shown for simplicity). Domestic 
inflation is thus part of the fundamentals, and well as the foreign real interest rate r* plus the foreign rate of 
inflation π*. The role of the time preference rate is ignored here, and the relevant variables become the 
nominal domestic interest rate R, and the term (r*+π*). Assuming that π=π* (fixed exchange rate case), 
and defining R=r-π, the real interest rate differential summarizes the role the relevant variables. 
22 See HINKLE & MONTIEL [1999], pp.288-89.   16
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Accordingly, the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate is a function of the import 
content of government expenditure (fiscal stance), the real interest differential, the terms 





IV. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
 
In order to operationalize equation (4), let us assume that the long-run relationship 
existing between the actual real exchange rate and its fundamentals is linear and can be 
captured by simple log transformation of the variables. The relationship to be estimated 
takes the form of equation (5): 
 
t t t X e ε β + = ' l n                   ( 5 )  
with X being a vector of permanent values of the fundamentals,  and εt being a mean-zero 
white noise disturbance term.  
 
In order to investigate the existence of a long-run relationship among the model variables, 
the Johansen maximum likelihood estimation technique is used, through a vector error-
correction specification. Let us recall briefly that the Johansen procedure is based on 
reduced rank regressions. When the multivariate model contains I(0) and/or I(1) 
variables, the testing procedure is fairly standard. The model to estimate is as follows:  
 
T 1,.., =      t ... 1 1 t t k t k t t D X A X A X ε µ + Ψ + + + + = − −               (5) 
 
Where Xt is a p×  1 vector of stochastic variables, X-k+1,...,u0 are fixed, εt is the 
uncorraleted Gaussian error term , and Dt is a vector of non-stochastic variables such as 
seasonal dummies or even weakly exogenous variables which can be excluded from the 
cointegration space. The model is then reformulated in the following error-correction 
form: 
 
T 1,.., =      t ... 1 1 1 1 1 t t t k t k t t D X x X X ε µ + Ψ + + Π + Γ + + Γ = ∆ − + − − −               (6) 
   17
The hypothesis of cointegration is formulated as a reduced rank of the Π-matrix: 
ΗΠ 1() : ' r =α β    where α and β are p × r matrices of full rank (α represents the speed of 
adjustment to disequilibrium and β is a matrix of long-run coefficients). The hypothesis 




With this framework in mind, we now turn to the specifics of the model estimated. 
Regarding the estimation period, it is fair to recognize that Brazil does not provide an 
easy training field for the researcher, having gone through six different stabilization plans 
from 1986 to 1994. The fact that various currencies and different exchange rate systems 
were present until the adoption of the Real plan in January 1994 suggests that any 
econometric investigation venturing before 1994 exposes itself to serious risks of 
structural breaks. Notwithstanding these difficulties, some authors (e.g.MERLIN  & 
PORTUGAL [2002]) have addressed this risk with the use of dummy variables to control 
for the various stabilization periods and for the 1989-91 REER peak noted in section II. 
The use of dummy variables does not solve the structural break issue, however, nor does 
it alleviate the problem of “transitioning” between different currencies. These authors 
estimated a real exchange rate model similar to the used in this paper, and found a level 
of real overvaluation close to 7% in 1998, using quarterly data from 1994 to 2000. Earlier 
empirical work on the issue simply did not try to control for possible structural breaks. 
For instance, AGENOR, HOFFMEISTER & MEDEIROS [1997], estimated a near-VAR model 
using monthly data and linking capital flows, interest rate differentials, government 
spending, money-base velocity and the REER from 1988 to 1995, and found that world 
interest rate shocks had a significant impact on both capital inflows and the REER. Other 
studies covering roughly the same period include MELO [1998], who concludes that the 
REER was continuously undervalued up to 1995, and HOLANDA [1999], who estimated 
that the REER was overvalued by about 15% in the second quarter of 1998. The 
existence of five years of data following the devaluation allows us, however, to use the 
Real Plan as a starting time in order to avoid dealing with potential breaks in the series. 
This approach involves tradeoffs, however, as the length of the sample will be inevitably 
shorter. To circumvent this problem, it was decided to conduct the estimation using 
monthly data from July 1994 (i.e. formal introduction of the Real) through December 
2003. Arguably, this choice is questionable, especially given the noise associated with 
higher frequency data; likewise, monthly data are usually not available, and must be 
extrapolated using quarterly data –which ruins the potential usefulness of the exercise. 
Fortunately, this is not an issue in the case of Brazil, because a significant number of time 
series are published in a monthly basis in Brazil. What is still debatable, however, is the 
relevance of some macroeconomic aggregates (e.g. GDP) on a monthly basis and the 
seasonality issue in such data.  
 
With these important caveats in mind, we turn now to the description of variables 
entering vector Xt: 
 
                                                 
23See JOHANSEN [1991] and JOHANSEN &  JUSELIUS [1990].    18
The  real effective exchange rate (REER) was constructed for the purpose of the 
estimation as a geometric weighted average of the seasonally adjusted consumer price 
index and the exchange rate index, US dollar per national currency, period average (IMF 
methodology). Please note that an increase of REER denotes an appreciation, meaning 
that REER actually represents the relative price of non-tradable goods, whereas the 
theoretical model presented in section III uses the mirror definition of the real exchange 
rate. The trade weighting used are the average weighting for Brazil’s ten largest trading 
partners from 1995 to 2003. The variable is in logarithmic form. 
Sources: International Finance Statistics (IFS), Banco Central do Brasil 
 
Productivity differentials are traditionally captured by relative sector prices, proxied by 
the indexed trade-weighted ratio of relative prices between Brazil and its main trading 
partners (RELP). More precisely, the index takes the following form, as in ALBEROLA et 
alt. [1999]:  * * PPI CPI
PPI CPI RELP =   
The trade weighting used are the same as for REER and the variable is in logarithmic 
form. An increase in the index denotes a rise in the relative price of non-tradables versus 
tradables, and is therefore associated with an appreciation of the real exchange rate.   
Sources: International Finance Statistics (IFS), Banco Central do Brasil 
 
The impact of government expenditure and the fiscal stance in general on the real 
exchange rate is not a priori clear-cut, mostly because it depends a lot on the share of 
tradables and non-tradables in government spending. In order to differentiate government 
spending, one possibility is to use government  investment spending as a proxy for 
government consumption of tradables (mostly because the import content of investment 
is likely to be higher) and government recurrent spending as a proxy for government 
consumption of non-tradables
24.  Recurrent expenditure is defined here as total 
expenditure minus investment spending and debt servicing spending. An important 
caveat is that the data refers to the cash execution of the Tesouro Nacional, as published 
by IPEA.  Data coverage is therefore limited, which means that the two constructed 
variables GOV1 (log of government investment to GDP) and GOV2 (log of government 
recurrent expenditure to GDP) are –at best- only partial proxies of primary expenditures 
trends
25. With this caveat in mind, a rise in GOV1 is associated with a depreciation of the 
REER, while a rise in GOV2 is associated with an appreciation of the REER. 
Source: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) 
 
In order to capture the terms of trade effect, two alternatives variables were constructed, 
following a recent trend in the literature. Rather than using a standard terms of trade ratio 
(Pexports/Pimports), two real commodity price indices were constructed, to reflect the role of 
primary products in Brazil’s trade structure. More specifically, the variables are 
computed as the weighted average of Brazil’s top five commodity export nominal prices 
(i.e. Sugar, Soy, Iron, Coffee and Tobacco) deflated either by a trade-weighted price 
index for the exports from a group of industrialized countries (Germany, Korea, Japan, 
                                                 
24 This approach actually follows HINKLE & MONTIEL [1999], Chapter 10. 
25 Moreover, the mismatching problem between accrued and recorded expenditures is particularly acute 
with high frequency data.    19
the UK and the US), or by the US CPI index 
26. These two proxies are referred to as 
RELCOM and RELCOM2, and are expressed in logarithmic forms. As for the standard 
terms of trade ratio, the intuition is that higher commodity prices tend to drive up wages, 
thus leading to an increase in non-tradable prices
27.  
Sources: Banco Central do Brasil, IFS, IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, and Instituto 
de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) 
 
The trade stance variable is proxied by a “standard” openness ratio (OPEN), calculated 
as the ratio of exports and imports to GDP. An increase in trade flows is usually 
associated with a more liberal trade stance. 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil 
 
The real interest rate differential (IDIF) was calculated as the difference between the real 
overnight interest rate in Brazil (SELIC) and the real 90 day US T-bill rate
28. 
Sources: International Finance Statistics (IFS), Banco Central do Brasil 
 
Finally, in order to control for the devaluation of the Real, which intervened in January 
1999, a post-devaluation dummy variable (DEVAL) is added to the estimation, taking the 
value of 1 from January 1999 onwards. This post-devaluation dummy is assumed to pick 
up the likely overvaluation of the real exchange rate preceding the devaluation as well as 
the possible overshooting subsequent to the devaluation. The sign of this variable is 
expected to be negative. 
 
The different variables are presented in Chart 14. We now proceed with the cointegration 
analysis. As shown in Table 2, all variables are I(1) at the 10% level. Note that the unit 
root test for the real interest differential is actually quite close to the critical value but this 
may well reflect the fact that nominal interest rates were extremely high at the onset of 
the Real plan, which my create a statistical illusion of convergence over time.  
 
Two alternative models are estimated, using the different real commodity variables, 
between 1994:7 and 2003:12.  The results of the VAR estimation are reported in Table 3 
and 4. In order to ensure that the residuals are Gaussian "white noise", that is, to make 
sure they do not suffer from autocorrelation or non-normality, the lag order was tested 
using the Schwartz criterion. 
                                                 
26 See MCDONALD & RICCI [2003]. 
27 See CAHSIN, CESPEDES & SAHAY [2002]. Note that real commodity prices have been traditionally 
deflated by export prices of industrialized countries, referred to as the MUV index, in the empirical  
literature. This index is only computed on an annual basis by the World Bank, making any data 
extrapolation impossible. The export price series has therefore been recreated on a monthly basis, using IFS 
data.   
28 Real interest rates are proxied by the nominal monthly rate minus the annualized monthly inflation rate.   20
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No trend ADF 
ADF Statistics  
Lag 
length 
1% level  5% level  10% level  Integration 
order 
REER  -1.31  1  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(1) 
RELP  -0.27  1  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(1) 
IDIF  -2.49  4  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(1) 
RELCOM  -1.30  1  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(1) 
RELCOM2  -0.81  1  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(1) 
GOV1  -2.35  3  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(1) 
GOV2  -1.68  2  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(1) 
OPEN 1.22  1  -3.48  -2.88 -2.57 I(1) 
dREER  -7.16**  0  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(0) 
dRELP  -9.70**  0  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(0) 
dIDIF -12.56**  1  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(0) 
dRELCOM -9.09**  0  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(0) 
DRELCOM2 -8.78**  0  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(0) 
dGOV1  -15.85**  2  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(0) 
dOV2 -9.86**  1  -3.48 -2.88 -2.57 I(0) 
dOPEN 18.77**  1 -3.48  -2.88 -2.57 I(0) 
(**) denotes the rejection of the null-hypothesis of a unit root at the 5%. 
ADF tests carried out with intercept. Lag order determined in minimizing the Schwartz criterion. 
 




Eigenvalue  Likelihood 5 Percent  1 Percent  Hypothesized 
Lag order=1  Ratio  Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s) 
 0.286476   126.2149 109.99  119.80        None ** 
 0.262517   88.07291  82.49   90.45     At most 1 * 
 0.235588   53.66305  59.46   66.52     At most 2 
 0.137196   23.30574  39.89   45.58     At most 3 
 0.038839   6.630593  24.31   29.75     At most 4 
 0.017848   2.154244  12.53   16.31     At most 5 
 0.001054   0.119218   3.84    6.51     At most 6 




Eigenvalue  Likelihood  5 Percent  1 Percent  Hypothesized 
Lag order=1  Ratio  Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s) 
 0.290843   127.1156  109.99  119.80        None ** 
 0.270040   88.27986   82.49   90.45     At most 1 * 
 0.205250   52.71141   59.46   66.52     At most 2 
 0.148853   26.75218   39.89   45.58     At most 3 
 0.054731   8.539973   24.31   29.75     At most 4 
 0.017476   2.179688   12.53   16.31     At most 5 
 0.001658   0.187465    3.84    6.51     At most 6 
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Table 4. Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients 
 
Model 1 
 (lag order=5) 
             
Standardized  REER RELP  RELCOM1 RELCOM2 GOV1  GOV2  OPEN  IDIF 
eigenvector   1  -0.20 -0.21    0.46 -0.46 0.57  -0.001 
   Std Error  (0.07)  (0.08)    (0.12) (0.11) (0.13)  (0.00) 
  T-Ratio  (-2.88) (-2.48)    (3.06) (-4.17) (4.18)  (-2.44) 
Speed of 
adjustment of 
REER  -0.14 
           
 Std Error  (0.06)             
T-Ratio  (-2.33)             
R²  0.53             
R²-adjusted  0.31    Included observations =113 after adjusting endpoints   
Log Likelihood  991.68             
Model 2 
 (lag order=5) 
             
Standardized  REER RELP  RELCOM1 RELCOM2 GOV1  GOV2  OPEN  IDIF 
eigenvector   1 -0.32   -0.27  0.046  -0.17  0.16  -0.0005 
   Std Error  (0.04)   (0.06  (0.06)  (0.06) (0.07)  (0.00) 
  T-Ratio  (-7.58)   (-4.11)  (0.68)  (-2.86) (2.15)  (-2.17) 
Speed of 
adjustment of 
REER  -0.23 
 Std Error  (0.08)  
T-Ratio  (-2.76)  
R²  0.54  
R²-adjusted  0.33    Included observations =113 after adjusting endpoints   
Log Likelihood  1005.7           
 
 
The results reported in Table 4 show evidence of one cointegrating vector for each model 
at the 1% level (possibly two cointegration vectors at the 5% level), suggesting a long 
term relationship between the real exchange rate, relative prices, real commodity prices, 
government expenditures on tradables and on non-tradables, the openness ratio and the 
real interest rate differential.  
 
Model 1 
IDIF OPEN GOV GOV RELCOM RELP REER 001 . 0 57 . 0 2 46 . 0 1 46 . 0 1 21 . 0 20 . 0 + − + − + =
 
Model 2 
IDIF OPEN GOV GOV RELCOM RELP REER 0005 . 0 17 . 0 2 18 . 0 1 05 . 0 2 27 . 0 32 . 0 + − + + − + =  
 
In both models, all variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant, with 
the exception of the dummy variable which was not statistically different from zero at the 
10% level in either specifications (and therefore not reported in Table 4). In model 1, 
government expenditure on non-tradables appears to have a strong positive impact on the 
real exchange rate: a 1% increase in this type of government expenditure is associated 
with a 0.46% REER appreciation. The effect is smaller, however, in the second model,   23
raising some stability issues. Government expenditure on tradables also has a strong 
impact, in the opposite direction, as a 1% increase in the coefficient triggers a 0.46% 
depreciation of the REER. Other important effects include the positive impact of real 
commodity prices, irrespective of the denominator chosen, and the negative impact of the 
trade stance variable, which certainly picks up the impact of trade liberalization initiated 
in the early 1990s. A somewhat surprising result is the relatively small size of the relative 
productivity ratio (RELP) compared to international evidence: according to model 1, a 
1% increase in the relative price ratio (higher non-tradable prices) is associated with a 
less than proportional real exchange rate appreciation or about 0.2%, whereas its impact 
is three to four times as large in other countries (ALBEROLA et.al.[1999]). In contrast, in 
their REER estimation covering the 1984-2000 period, MERLIN  & PORTUGAL [2002] 
found a relative productivity estimate close to 1.5, which appears to be much larger than 
results obtained in other countries. This difference could reflect a number of factors, 
including cross-correlation with other variables
29, or the fact that the relative price ratio 
performs poorly as a proxy of productivity differential because of the different 
composition of indices in terms of tradables and non-tradables in Brazil and abroad. 
Lastly, the impact of the real interest rate differential on the real exchange rate is positive, 
as one should expect, but the size of the coefficient is very small (i.e. a 1% increase in the 
differential is associated with a 0.001% increase in REER). This could be either due to 
measurement problems, or to the series of capital controls and sterilization policies 
conducted during the Real plan aimed at slowing down real currency appreciation in the 
face of strong capital inflows.  
 
The speed of adjustment between the real exchange rate and its long term equilibrium 
value, as measured by the error correction term reported in Table 4 is ranging from 0.14 
to 0.23, depending on the model specification, implying that that about 15-20% of the 
gap is eliminated every period and that full adjustment takes place within a maximum of 
one year and a half, in the absence of other shocks
30. This seems to be relatively fast, but 
given the high volatility of the real exchange rate in the 1990s and the 1999 devaluation, 
this is certainly plausible.  
 
As regards the short run dynamics, most short-run effects were found to be insignificant 
at the 10% level (and therefore not reported in the interest of space), with the exception 
of innovations in the real exchange rate and government expenditures (GOV1 and 
GOV2). As regards the latter, a change in GOV1 was associated with an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate in the short run while an increase in GOV2 was associated to a real 
exchange depreciation. This could well reflect the traditional overshooting impact effect 
in a sticky price environment.  
 
As far as the robustness of results are concerned, it should be noted that the choice of the 
real commodity price variable does have an impact on the size of the coefficients, as 
                                                 
29 When the estimation is performed on the basis on a “reduced form” of the model, using the same relative 
price ratio as well as net foreign assets (i.e. the left-hand side of equation 2), the coefficient of RELP 
“raises” to about 0.60, which is close to international evidence. 
30 With model 1, half of the gap is closed after seven months, implying that full adjustment takes place 
within 1 year and a half. With model 2, the full gap is closed in less than one year.   24
evidenced by the differences between model 1 and model 2 (table 4). One should also 
emphasize that although neither models exhibits any autocorrelation, other statistical 
properties (tests for skewness, kurtosis and normality of the residuals, and eigenvalue 
stability condition test) yielded mixed results, which calls for caution in the interpretation 
of results
31.   
 
Notwithstanding these borderline statistical properties, the next step is to compute some 
measures of the equilibrium real exchange rate and to analyze the implied real exchange 
rate misalignment. Three alternative measures can be constructed, ranging from “naïve” 
to “sophisticated”. The first one is purely mechanical and consists of calculating the 
median real equilibrium exchange rate since the 1999 devaluation
32 and to use this 
permanent value as a benchmark against which to measure potential misalignments, 
treating the equilibrium REER as constant . The second measure is to use the 
cointegration vector reported in Table 4 to calculate the level of the real exchange rate, 
which is consistent in the long run with the equilibrium values of the explanatory 
variables. Typically, this type of measure involves neutralizing the temporary 
fluctuations in the cointegration relationship with the Hodrick-Prescott filter, a smoothing 
technique which has been extensively used in the recent literature
33. Lastly, the third 
measure is to compute the real equilibrium exchange rate using both the long-term 
cointegrating vector as well as the short run deviations of the ECM representation 
reported in Table 4, thereby decomposing the real exchange rate into permanent and 
transitory components, using the method originally proposed by GONZALO  & 
GRANGER[1995]. The main advantage of the proposed decomposition between I(1) and 
I(0) components is that the transitory component does not “Granger cause” the permanent 
component in the long run, which is itself a linear combination of contemporaneously 
observed variables.  
 
Let us define the orthogonal components  α⊥ and β⊥ as the eigenvectors associated with 
the unit eigenvalues of the matrices (I-α(α’α)
-1 α’) and (I-β(β’β)
-1β’), respectively, with 
α’⊥α = 0 and β’⊥β = 0. Xt can thus be written as equation (7):   
    
() ( ) t t t X X X ' ' '




⊥ ⊥ ⊥ + =                                      (7) 
 
where  ()t X ⊥
−
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ α β α β
1 '  captures the permanent component and  ( ) t X ' '
1β α β α
−  depicts 
the transitory component.  
Using model 1, all three measures are reported in Chart 15, together with the actual real 
exchange rate between 1991 and 2003, and the implied misalignment of the REER is 
                                                 
31 Specifically, although the hypothesis of normality of residuals could not be rejected, the eigenvalue 
stability condition test indicated that one of the 35 eigenvalue modulus was equal to 1, which is normally a 
sign of instability.  
32 The choice of the benchmarking period is key for the usefulness of this approach, which has been applied 
in some investment bank reports on emerging markets. It is to be noted that this is close to an extreme PPP 
version, as it assumes that the REER is constant in the long run.   
33 The smoothing parameter was set to 14400, as usually suggested for monthly data. It is fair to recognize, 
however, that the HP filter has its drawbacks, the most serious being that the filter seems to perform poorly 
at the beginning and the end of the series.    25
reported in Chart 16. As can be expected, the three measures convey slightly different 
stories regarding the misalignment of the Brazilian currency over time
34.   
 



























































































































































































Chart 16. Implied Real Effective Exchange Rate Misalignment 
(Percentage Deviation from Actual REER) 
 































































































                                                 
























































Interestingly, irrespective of the measure chosen, real exchange rate misalignments seem 
to have been moderate in the 1990s, including during the period immediately preceding 
the devaluation of the Real. The growing overvaluation of the currency in real terms is 
picked up both by the “naïve” and the “long run” approaches, but the magnitude of the 
actual misalignment appears to be surprisingly small, i.e. around 5-6%. It is also worth 
noting that the decomposition between permanent and transitory components yielded 
rather unhelpful results, exhibiting some fair amount of noise while closely replicating 
the actual REER path. This is perhaps not overly surprising, however, given the use of 
high-frequency data. These results are broadly consistent with those of MERLIN  & 
PORTUGAL [2002]), which raise some interesting questions regarding the evolving nature 
of fundamentals during the inflation stabilization period. Actually, the misalignment 
puzzle discussed in section II seems to strike back. This is not to say that the real 
exchange rate was not overvalued (numerous indicators point to the contrary), but our 
results show that the underlying fundamentals were consistent with the growing real 
appreciation of the real from 1995 to 1998. Another consideration to be kept in mind is 
that the Real appreciated the most in the initial phase of the disinflation program, 
between 1994 and 1996, that is at the beginning of our sample. This could well bias the 
alleged misalignment downwards, as illustrated by our discussion of overvaluation 
estimates in section II.   
 
In any case, our estimation gives some support to the supply-side influences as well as 
demand-side influences on the real exchange rate path, as noted in IMF[1998]. The real 
appreciation of the exchange rate not only reflected productivity growth and the 
restructuring of the economy (the supply-side, mostly driven by the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect), but also by important demand elements, such as the widening of the public sector 
deficit. Indeed, a real appreciation driven by a rise in public expenditure (and the 
associated decline in the fiscal position) leads to growing misalignments. It is fair to 
admit that both supply and demand effects actually counterbalanced each other as   27
determinants of the real exchange rate, as evidenced by the small “overall misalignment” 
reported on the basis of our estimation. However, it seems plausible to assume that the 
existence of strong demand elements had an impact on the sustainability of the current 
account deficit, especially given the fiscal situation, as discussed in section II.  
 
The other interesting result is that misalignment swings seem to have been more 
pronounced in the years following the devaluation than during the years before. In 
particular, important departures from equilibrium are picked up by the model in 2002, 
which certainly reflects the large nominal volatility recorded that year, as markets 
became increasingly nervous in the lead up to the October 2002 presidential election. 
Lastly, and although caution is required given the inherent limitations of this exercise, the 
Real appeared to be more or less aligned as of end 2003, with a minor misalignment 
range (-4 to +4%), depending on the benchmark used as the “equilibrium” REER. 
Compared to its long-run equilibrium, the actual REER may even be slightly overvalued. 
In any case, our results strongly reject the massive undervaluation of the Real implied by 
the Big Mac Index discussed in section II.   
 
 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS REGARDING TRADE PERFORMANCE & COMPETITIVENESS 
SINCE THE 1999 DEVALUATION 
 
Apart from the topical issue of the Real misalignment, the results presented in the 
previous section have also some policy implications regarding trade performance and 
competitiveness in Brazil. While the service balance (services, income and transfers) 
remain traditionally negative in Brazil owing to large net services imports and interest 
payments, the trade balance plays an important “damage limitation” role in total external 
balance. It is striking that trade performance improved only very marginally between 
1999 and 2002 (Chart 9), although the REER depreciated by some 35% following the 
devaluation of the Real. The turnaround of the trade surplus actually materialized in the 
course of 2003, mainly driven by import contraction, as noted in section II.  
 
If one accepts the conclusions drawn in the previous section regarding the absence of 
sizable real exchange rate misalignment at the end of 2003, it may be relevant to quickly 
analyze the main determinants of trade flows between 1999 and 2003, not only focusing 
on the role of the real exchange rate in Brazilian trade flows, but also on other 
determinants. Besides the actual level of the real exchange rate as a standard measure of 
price competitiveness, other factors are certainly relevant in the case of Brazil, such as 
REER volatility (which was high from 1999 to 2002). For instance, PAIVA   [2003]   
investigated the issue of trade elasticities in Brazil from 1991 to 2001 and found, as 
expected, that trade flows were not only responsive to the real exchange rate, but also to 
real exchange rate volatility: in particular, real exchange rate volatility was found to have 
a negative impact on export volumes. The suspicion was not new, but earlier research 
proved inclusive (GONZAGA & TERRA [1997]). These recent results also showed that 
exports of primary goods seem to be more responsive to the real exchange rate than other 
categories of exports, which confirms the general observation that primary goods   28
typically have low income and high price elasticities
35. Actually, trade figures reveal a 
resilient trend towards increased specialization in primary goods, a trend that was 
reversed in the 1980s, but which emerged again in the mid-1990s. As can be seen in 
Chart 17, the share of primary goods in total exports has increased significantly since 
1999, whereas the share the manufactured goods declined during the same period. This is 
important for Brazil, as our results suggest that one of the determinants of the REER is 
real commodity prices, implying an interesting inverse relationship between overall 
competitiveness and the terms of trade. This may also explain the somewhat 
disappointing trade performance in the period immediately following the devaluation, 
since commodity prices and manufactured prices were quite depressed. By contrast, the 
recent burgeoning of exports in Brazil essentially captures booming commodity prices as 
well as the growing demand in China for some Brazilian export products -mainly soy and 
steel- , the two factors being closely related.   
 
 





















































































Another important conclusion of the analysis conducted by PAIVA [2003] is that the 
elasticity of imports to domestic income is approximately twice as high as the elasticity 
of exports to foreign income. This is of course a source of concern, as one of the possible 
implications is that, other things being equal, domestic economic stagnation may favor 
the emergence of trade surpluses. Although this may be an extreme statement, this 
illustrates the fact that the competitiveness of exports may also depend on other factors 
than the level or the volatility of the real exchange rate. Indeed, a country’s comparative 
advantage depends not only on price and cost competitiveness, but also on nonprice 
competitiveness, such as technological innovation, investment in physical and human 
capital, and service-related factors. In the case of Brazil, one must emphasize the role of 
structural rigidities, i.e. the so-called “Custo Brasil”. These costs include, inter alia, a 
very heavy tax system, infrastructure bottlenecks, a cumbersome legal system, labor 
productivity issues associated with the existing labor code, issues related to the general 
                                                 
35 OECD [2001], p.142.   29
business regulations, and last but not least, lack of access to financing and high financial 
intermediation costs
36. It seems indeed that the lack of availability of trade finance 
through the banking system significantly impacted trade flows since the 1999 
devaluation, especially on the import financing side. As shown in Chart 18 below, import 
financing lines have basically been halved from 2001 to end 2003, whereas export 
financing restarted to grow at the beginning of 2003. Although other factors may be 
relevant, these financing problems are related to the level of interest rates in Brazil and to 
the very sizable banking spreads in general






























Export Financing Import Financing
 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil 
 
 
All in all, this very general discussion of the main determinants of trade flows since the 
1999 devaluation hints some of the remaining challenges associated with export 
competitiveness, which go well beyond real exchange rate consideration. The best 
illustration is certainly the fact that the overall profitability of Brazilian exports seem to 
have deteriorated significantly since the third quarter of 2002, way beyond REER 
movements, as shown in Chart 19. As of April 2004, the profitability of Brazilian exports 
was actually back to its August 1994 starting value, i.e. right after the launching of the 
Real plan. This may actually reflect the pass-through effect of higher energy prices on 








                                                 
36 See WORLD BANK [2004]. 
37 One may argue that large firms have usually recourse to external financing, but the issue is not 
fundamentally different as the cost of external financing depends on the country risk (usually measured by 
the spread over US Treasuy bills).   30
 
 







































































































Export Profitability Index (LHS)
REER (Inverted scale, RHS)
 
Note: the Export Profitability Index (Indice de Rentabilidade das Exportações Totais) is computed by 
FUNCEX using the average nominal exchange rate corrected for the cost structure of exports and the 
differences between export and input prices across 35 sectors. Base: August 1994=100. 




VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper provided an econometric analysis of the determinants of the real exchange rate 
in Brazil from 1994 to 2003, using an unrestricted vector autoregression technique. The 
results present evidence of a long-run relationship existing between the real effective 
exchange rate, relative productivity differentials, real commodity prices, the ratio of 
government expenditure on tradables to GDP, the ratio of government expenditure on 
non-tradables to GDP, trade openness and interest rates differentials. The analysis 
suggests, inter alia, that the speed of adjustment between the real exchange rate and its 
long term equilibrium value is relatively fast, with full adjustment taking place within a 
maximum of one year and a half, in the absence of other shocks. In addition, the results 
indicate that real exchange rate misalignments seem to have been surprisingly moderate 
in the 1990s, including during the period immediately preceding the devaluation of the 
Real, which supports earlier econometric work. Such results suggest that both supply-side 
effects and demand-side effects put pressure on the real exchange rate path, and tend to 
indicate that there was perhaps no inherent inevitability –from a misalignment standpoint 
alone- in the timing of the 1999 devaluation. However, given the borderline statistical 
properties of our estimates, and given the use of high frequency data, care is needed when 
interpreting these results. It seems safe to conclude that the misalignment puzzle is not 
totally exhausted and certainly deserves additional empirical investigation. Furthermore,   31
what constitutes an equilibrium in the non-trivial world of real exchange rate is still 
heavily debated, as it is not easy to choose the “right” benchmark. 
 
The other finding of this paper is that as of end 2003, the Real was found to be slightly 
appreciated with respect to the estimated equilibrium level, although the extent of the 
misalignment appears to be small as well. Yet, as pointed out in section VI, the overall 
profitability of exports declined from mid 2002 to early 2004, despite favorable 
commodity prices. From a policy perspective, relying on a flexible exchange rate with an 
inflation targeting regime inevitably raises some difficult policy dilemma regarding the 
optimal rate of real exchange rate depreciation which would be consistent with stabilizing 
inflation and maintaining external balance, without hampering the growth of economic 
activity. In this respect, one logical conclusion is that additional structural reforms are 
needed in order to increase the competitiveness of the Brazilian economy. Furthermore, 
such reforms would no doubt reinforce the credibility of the inflation targeting regime, 
and thereby alleviating the policy dilemma highlighted before.   
 
 
******   32
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